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THE DEATH PENALTY IN JAPAN:
AN "ABSURD" PUNISHMENT*
Joachim Herrmannt
INTRODUCTION
In 1957, Albert Camus, the famous French writer and
philosopher, published his reflections about the guillotine,
Rdflexions sur la Guillotine.' He began his essay, a crusade
against capital punishment, with a story about his father.
Camus had never met his father, and the anecdote was
allegedly one of the very few things he knew about him. Here is
an abbreviated version of what Camus reported in his
reflections.
Shortly before World War I, a man who had committed
a most atrocious crime-he had killed a farmer's entire family,
parents and children-was sentenced to death by an Algiers
court. The man, a farmhand, had killed in a blood lust but had
also taken property from his victims. It was a sensational case
in Algiers. The general public believed that decapitation was
too mild a punishment for such a monster. This was also the
opinion of Camus' father who was, above all, upset over the
killing of the children. As a consequence, he decided to watch
for the first time the public execution. In the middle of the
night, he arose and joined the crowd which was walking to the
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other end of the city where the execution would be carried out
early in the morning.
When the father returned, he did not tell anyone what
he had seen. He seemed to have come home in a great hurry,
his face expressing bewilderment. Without saying a word, he
laid down on his bed and suddenly began to vomit. He had
discovered the reality hidden behind the bombastic and
deceptive phrases of justice. The father did not think of the
massacred children; he could only think of the trembling and
shaking body, thrown on a plank to have his head cut off.
Like the other great existentialist philosopher Jean
Paul Sartre, Camus expressed his philosophical ideas not in
scholarly treatises but in essays and novels. One of his
philosophical keynotes is the "absurdity" of life. Camus did not
say that all life is "absurd." Rather, he explained that there are
certain events in life which can only be properly understood if
their "absurdity" is considered.
What had happened to Camus' father was such an
"absurd" event. His father had a strong feeling of justice, so
rather than sleep, he walked through the night to see justice
take its course. Yet, after exposure to the execution, he broke
down, disgusted by what he had thought to be justice. Camus'
father did not talk because there was nothing he could have
said about a punishment that he had discovered was senseless,
unreasonable, and inexplicable or, in another word, "absurd."
The father had no objection against the imposition of justice
but he was shocked to see how it was executed.
"Absurdity" to Camus was not only an emotional
experience. If it had been limited in this way his father's
problem could have been solved by simply executing criminals
behind closed doors. This has become common practice in
almost all countries that still retain the death penalty. In
Japan, executions are even shrouded in peculiar secrecy.
Camus' concept of "absurdity" is much broader because
it also has an intellectual dimension. Certain events in life
which are ordinarily accepted without much questioning may
become senseless, unreasonable, and inexplicable, in brief,
"absurd," if we are willing to take a closer view. The concept of
"absurdity" thus opens new perspectives and helps to gain a
deeper insight. At the same time, it may provide an
opportunity for developing new answers.
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As Camus was not a lawyer, he was not concerned with
whether capital punishment or the law providing for its
imposition and the manner of its execution, may be considered
"absurd." For lawyers it will, however, be a worthwhile
endeavor to take a step beyond Camus and ask whether and to
what extent the law that serves as a basis for imposing and
executing the death penalty appears to be unreasonable,
irrational, senseless, and inexplicable. This will be an
interesting approach if one is willing to accept that the death
penalty is not just another kind of punishment. Rather, it is
qualitatively different from the other penalties and, therefore,
requires special legal safeguards.
This Essay will ask to what extent Japanese law and
practice of capital punishment can be considered "absurd." The
Essay will analyze the "absurdity" of Japanese capital
punishment with the help of comparative law. Since Japanese
criminal law and procedure has been strongly influenced by
German and American law and Japanese scholars are closely
following what is going on in these two legal systems, it seems
only natural to take the two systems as points of reference.
Because the United States, like Japan, has retained capital
punishment, comparisons will be mainly concentrated on
American law. However, even though Germany has abolished
capital punishment, looking at German law will also provide
some interesting aspects. Provisions of the German Penal Code
define various types of homicide and, thus, offer a rational
basis for distinguishing different levels of punishment.
The following discussion will be divided into two parts.
Part I examines in which cases capital punishment may be,
and actually is, imposed in Japan. A comparison of Japanese
law with German law, where life imprisonment is the severest
penalty, will reveal interesting differences about the legal
structures of the sentencing decisions. The differences will be
even more striking when looking at the United States where
the thirty-eight states that still retain capital punishment have
enacted statutes that try to provide a new basis for the capital
punishment decision. Part II will then try to shed some light on
the procedure followed in Japan after the imposition of the
death sentence until its execution and compare it with the
American practice. The analysis will reveal that capital
2002]
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punishment in Japan-and also in the United States-must in
many respects be deemed "absurd."
I. CRIMINAL LAW AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
A. Japan
The Japanese Penal Code provides capital punishment
for some seventeen offenses, but according to Japanese
statistics this penalty is imposed in practice only in cases of
homicide and killing committed in the course of a robbery.2 The
Japanese Penal Code does not, however, offer any criteria to
guide the judge in deciding what punishment to impose.3 The
penalty for killing while committing a robbery is either death
or life imprisonment.4 In homicide cases the judge's discretion
is still wider because punishment may be death, life
imprisonment, or a prison term of not less than three years.5
The execution of a three-year term may even be suspended.
Toshino Maeda, a Japanese criminal law scholar, has tried to
demonstrate using empirical research that the discretion of
Japanese judges is strictly limited because they closely follow
unwritten rules and standards when choosing between death
and imprisonment.6 Koichi Miyazawa, a famous Japanese
scholar of criminal law and criminology, has not agreed
however. He stated that it may be mainly a question of good or
2 Jos6 Llompart, La Pena de Muerte en el Japon, 2 REVISTA DE DERECHO
PENAL Y CRIMINOLOGIA 349, 353 (1992).
3 KEIH5 [Japanese Penal Code], 1907, art. 199, 240. There are no jury trials in
Japan. Capital cases are heard by courts sitting with three professional judges.
4 Id. at art. 240.
'Id. at art. 199.
6 RYUICHI HIRANO, Die Japanisierung des westlichen Rechts im
Japanischen Strafrecht und Strafprozeflrecht, in DIE JAPANISIERUNG DES WESTLICHEN
RECHTS 387, 391 (Helmut Coing et al. eds., 1988). See also Jos6 Llompart, Die
Vollstreckung der Todesstrafe in Japan, in 1 THE REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE LAW 155,
158 (1988).
7 KOICHI MIYAZAWA, Die Todesstrafe in Japan, in STRAFGERECHTIGKEIT,
FESTSCHRIFT FUER ARTHUR KAUFmANN 729, 737-738 (Fritjof Haft et al. eds., 1993). See
also PETRA SCHMIDT, DIE TODESSTRAFE IN JAPAN 485 (1996); Llompart, supra note 2,
at 354 (pointing out that courts in the Osaka region impose capital punishment more
readily than courts in the Tokyo region).
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bad luck what kind of punishment the defendant will receive.
Miyazawa reported that an experienced and prominent
Japanese judge had told him about two homicide cases where
one defendant was sentenced to death and the other received a
prison term. The judge was of the opinion that the main reason
why the death penalty was imposed in one of the two cases was
that the judges sitting in that court were generally in favor of
capital punishment. In the judge's opinion, the defendant who
was sentenced to imprisonment had committed the more
serious crime.'
Obviously, the unwritten rules and standards Maeda
has talked about do not work as perfectly as he tried to
demonstrate. This is, however, not the main problem. The
principal question is whether relying on unwritten rules and
standards rather than on legal provisions is in conformity with
modern constitutional law and constitutional theory. Article 31
of the Japanese Constitution provides: "No person shall be
deprived of life or liberty nor shall any other criminal penalty
be imposed except according to procedure established by law.'
This article has been interpreted by Japanese scholars as
including the nulla poena sine lege principle. As Shigemitsu
Dando, a famous scholar at Tokyo University and former
Justice at the Japanese Supreme Court, has stated in his
famous treatise on Japanese criminal law, this principle
requires "both the type and magnitude of punishment to be
fixed by law.""0
Ryuichi Hirano, a famous criminal law scholar at Tokyo
University, has pointed out, however, that the Japanese Penal
Code performs, to a considerable extent, only a "symbolic
function" because it leaves many legal questions to be decided
by the judge, prosecutor, and police officer." Hirano has argued
that Japanese judges, prosecutors, and police officers generally
exercise a great amount of discretion in Japanese criminal
justice and that their discretion is not unlimited, but guided
SMIYAZAWA, supra note 7, at 737-38.
9 NIHON KOKU KEMP6 [Constitution of Japan], 1946, art. 31, translated in,
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD-JAPAN 17 (Albert P. Blaustein &
Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1990).
'o SHIGEMITSU DANDO, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF JAPAN: THE GENERAL PART
23 (B.J. George, trans., 1997).
1 HIRANO, supra note 6, at 391.
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and structured. Under modern constitutional law such a
combination of "symbolic legislation" and non-legal standards
and rules may be considered an adequate mechanism for
handling less serious and trivial cases. Regulating every detail
with the help of legal provisions would be too burdensome and
difficult to understand.
It seems questionable, however, whether "symbolic
legislation" can be accepted as the basis for solving important
cases, and there can be no doubt that capital cases have to be
ranked among them. Nulla poena, due process, and the idea of
"Rechtsstaat," i.e., a state governed by law, are also guiding
principles of Japanese constitutional law and require that
government power in the field of criminal justice be restricted
and structured by law. Legal provisions have a democratic
foundation, they guarantee predictability and uniformity in the
administration of criminal justice in a much better way than
unwritten rules and standards could ever do. Rules and
standards are developed by invisible institutions within the
Japanese criminal justice administration, they can easily be
changed and they are, as Miyazawa has pointed out, not
always followed.
In contrast to legal provisions, rules and standards are
often unknown to the defendant and defense counsel because
they are not published. This seems to be the case with the rules
guiding Japanese judges in their decisions on capital
punishment. As a consequence, defense counsel and defendant,
who in a Japanese trial try to offer arguments why the death
penalty should not be imposed, have to defend against an
unknown. This may be compared to the fight of Don Quixote,
the tragic Spanish knight, against the sails of a windmill which
he thought were an enemy attack.
Don Quixote's fight against the sails of the windmill is a
perfect example of the "absurdity" of life Camus has talked
about. In all deference, it may be asked whether "symbolic
legislation," the broad discretion of Japanese judges, the way
the judges seem to exercise discretion in practice, and, not the
least, the requirement that defendant and defense counsel
[Vol. 67: 3
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fight against invisible rules and standards do not show traces
of an "absurd" quality.
12
B. Germany
In trying to find new answers to this problem, it may be
helpful to look beyond the borders of Japan and ask how
homicide is punished in other legal systems. Germany, which
has abolished capital punishment, has nevertheless detailed
provisions in its Penal Code distinguishing various types of
homicide and, thus, providing for different levels of
punishment.
Under German law, manslaughter is punished with
imprisonment of not less than five and not more than fifteen
years. Life imprisonment must be imposed in cases of murder
where the judge finds that the killing was committed under
aggravating circumstances. The German Penal Code lists the
following aggravating circumstances:
" killing out of murderous lust
* killing to satisfy sexual desires
" killing for pecuniary gain
* killing from base motives
* killing treacherously
* killing cruelly
" killing with means dangerous to the public
* killing to make another crime possible or to cover it
up1
3
For less serious cases of manslaughter, for example if the
perpetrator was provoked, the German Penal Code provides for
a prison term of not less than one year and not more than ten
years.1
4
12 See generally MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, ADVENTURES OF DON QUIXOTE (J.M.
Cohen, trans., reprint ed. 1988).
1STRAFGESETZBUCH [German Penal Code] § 211(2) StGB, translated in
Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB), available at http'//www.iuscomp.org/gla-
statutes/StGB-.htm#211.
14Id. at § 212-213, available at http://www.iuscomp.org/glalstatutes/StGB-
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Unquestionably, some of the clauses defining murder in
the German Penal Code are rather abstract and vague. It is,
for example, unclear what is a "base motive" and in what cases
a killing may be called "treacherous." German courts have,
however, in a great number of cases offered interpretations to
shape those clauses and make them more concrete. Courts
have developed a kind of "case law" on which they will rely in
deciding future cases. Many of the decisions of the German
courts are published so anyone interested can find out what the
law is and what it most likely will be in the future. 5
In other European penal codes the law on homicide is
structured similarly. The new French Penal Code of 1994 is
one example. The Code lists two types of homicide. Ordinary
homicide is punished with imprisonment of thirty years; the
court is, however, authorized to impose a prison term of not
less than one year. 6 Life imprisonment is provided for in a
number of cases where homicide is committed under
aggravating circumstances; the punishment may, however, be
reduced to a prison term of not less than two years. The Code
defines as an aggravating factor, for example, that the
perpetrator acts with premeditation; that he or she kills while
committing or preparing another crime; or that the homicide
victim is a minor, lineal ascendant, person suffering from
corporal or mental impairment, judge, prosecutor, attorney or
witness."8 Similar to German practice, French courts have
handed down decisions making these clauses more concrete
and manageable.
It is not argued here that the definitions of European
codes, together with the accompanying "case law," offer ready
answers for the judge who has to decide what punishment to
impose in the individual case. However, unlike the Japanese
Penal Code, European codes and "precedents" restrict the most
severe punishment to a number of more or less narrowly
'r'ADOLF SCHONKE ET AL., STRAFGESETBUCH KOMMENTAR [German Penal
Code Commentary], § 211, notes IV-VI (2001).
" §§ 132-18, 221-1 - 221-4 C. PAN. [French Penal Code] 1994, translated in,
THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES-31 FRANCE 66, 94 (Edward A.
Tomlinson ed., 1999).
17 Id.
18 Id.
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defined cases of homicide. Thus, "road signs" are set up to
guide and structure the judge's discretion.
C. United States
The question of how much discretion the judge or the
jury should have in capital cases was also the cause of the
dramatic controversy over the constitutionality of capital
punishment in the United States. In 1972, the U.S. Supreme
-Court held in the landmark decision Furman v. Georgia that
unguided, standardless discretion in capital cases violates the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.'9 In a five to four decision, two of the Justices in
the majority thought that the death penalty violated the
Eighth Amendment under all circumstances.2 ' The three other
Justices in the majority took the view that unguided discretion
made the death penalty an unpredictable and, therefore, a
crhel and unusual punishment.2' Some of the Justices added
that the death penalty was disproportionately inflicted on the
basis of race, poverty, and ignorance.' It is important to note
that the Justices did not require proof of such discrimination in
the individual case. Rather, they considered it sufficient that
unguided discretion created a risk that capital punishment
might be imposed in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.
The effect of Furman was to strike down every death
penalty statute in the United States because none of the
statutes provided any guidance for the exercise of discretion.'
The majority of the American states, however, were not ready
to dispense with capital punishment. Within a few years many
states had enacted new capital punishment statutes.' Some of
those statutes provided for mandatory or automatic capital
'9 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
20 Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring), 370-71 (Marshall, J., concurring).
21 Id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring), 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring), 311-
15 (White, J., concurring).
22 Id. at 250 (quoting Rupert C. Koeninger, Capital Punishment in Texas,
1924-1968, 15 CRIME & DELiNQ. 132, 141 (1969)), 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
2 3STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 351
(2d ed. 2000).
24 id.
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punishment in particular cases.' They tried to solve the
problem of unguided and excessive discretion by eliminating
discretion all together. In 1976, the Supreme Court held,
however, that mandatory death penalty statutes violated the
Eighth Amendment because it required respect for the
offender's personality.26 Mandatory death penalty statutes
forbade distinguishing degrees of culpability among defendants
who were found guilty of the same category of crime.2 They
also made it impossible to take the defendant's character and
prior record into consideration. 8
As a consequence, most of the statutes enacted after
Furman took a new approach. They provided for a system of
guided and structured discretion by enumerating aggravating
as well as mitigating circumstances that the jury or the judge
has to consider when deciding whether the death penalty
should be inflicted.29 Criminal trials in the United States may
be conducted before a jury or a judge. While most criminal
cases are decided either by guilty pleas or bench trials, capital
cases are often tried before a jury because of their unique
nature. After the defendant is found guilty, a separate
sentencing hearing is conducted to decide on punishment.
Traditionally, this sentencing hearing has been held before a
judge. The majority of the post-Furman capital punishment
statutes provide, however, that the sentencing hearing be held
before a jury." By requiring that the jury decide on capital
punishment the statutes have tried to create a special
procedural safeguard for the defendant. Only a few of the post-
Furman statutes follow the traditional pattern and exclude the
jury from the sentencing hearing.3'
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor and defense
counsel introduce evidence not already offered at the trial and
present arguments. Based upon what they have heard about
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the judge or
25 Id.
26 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see also Roberts
v. Louisiana, 431 U.S. 633, 637 (1977).
27 SALTZBURG, supra note 23, at 352.2 1 Id. See also Summer v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 74-75 (1987).
29 SALTZBURG, supra note 23, at 352.
30 JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 527 (4th ed.
2000).
21 Id. at 528.
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jury decides whether to impose the death penalty or life
imprisonment. Sometimes they can provide for the possibility
of parole.
The Supreme Court has held in a number of cases that
such statutes are constitutional because they reduce the
likelihood of arbitrary sentencing. The Court considered the
separate sentencing hearing, as well as the structuring of the
sentencing decision with the help of aggravating and
mitigating criteria, to be essential mechanisms for the
protection of the defendant. This deserves special attention
because the American criminal justice administration is
dominated in many ways by unfettered and uncontrolled
discretion of the prosecutor, the judge, and the jury. For
example, the American prosecutor is free to decide whether or
not to bring a capital charge or to engage in plea bargaining
over a capital offense. Whenever the defendant is charged with
a capital crime the American jury or the judge may find the
defendant guilty of a lesser included offense that is not subject
to the death penalty.
The Supreme Court was aware of this imbalance
between ordinary cases, where broad and uncontrolled
discretion is not considered a problem, and capital punishment
cases where discretion should be limited and structured.33 The
Supreme Court was of the opinion that in capital cases special
procedural safeguards, as well as increased predictability, were
indispensable because capital punishment was considered a
penalty qualitatively different from any other penalty.34 The
Court reasoned in one of its capital punishment decisions that
the "fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment" required consideration of "the character and
record of the individual offender in the circumstances of the
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of
the process of inflicting the penalty of death." The reason why
the procedural safeguards needed to be increased in capital
32 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242, 252-53 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 263 (1976).
"For example, in Woodson v. North Carolina, the Court noted that "[dleath,
in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs
from one of only a year or two." 428 U.S. at 304-05.
3 Id.
" Id. at 304.
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cases were, according to the Court, the "evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."36
From a comparative point of view, it is interesting to
note that in the Japanese Constitution there is also a clause
outlawing cruel and unusual punishment." Other clauses of
the Japanese Constitution provide for the protection of life and
the respect of the individual. 8 As far as can be ascertained,
Japanese judges, however, have never embarked on
interpreting these clauses in a dynamic way comparable to the
approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice Shima of
the Japanese Supreme Court stated in a decision the Court
handed down in 1948 that "cruel punishment" is a flexible
concept that may change over time as feelings of the people
change."9 This was, however, only an obiter dictum that
remained without consequence. Japanese judges seem to
interpret the Japanese Constitution in a more static way-a
method which may better conform to traditional Japanese
values.
American capital punishment statutes enacted after
Furman provide for more or less detailed lists of aggravating
circumstances.0  Some of these circumstances resemble
traditional common law homicide categories, such as the felony
murder rule. Typical aggravating factors in U.S. state statutes
are the following:
" The murder was committed during the course of
a robbery or another crime involving violence.
* The murder was committed to avoid a lawful
arrest or to make an escape from lawful custody
possible.
36 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
37 NIHON KoKU KEMP6, supra note 9, at art. 36.
" Id. at arts. 11, 13, 31.
39 Chin Kim & Gary D. Garcia, Capital Punishment in the United States and
Japan: Constitutionality, Justification and Methods of Infliction, 11 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 253, 261 (1989).
40 KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 529-36; SALTZBURG, supra note 23, at 374-
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* The murder was committed by someone serving
a prison sentence.
* The murderer had a previous conviction of
another murder or a felony involving violence.
* The murderer knowingly created a great risk of
death to many persons.
" The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
* The murder was committed in an especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner.
Some statutes include special clauses to cover common
crimes in America.4 Examples include clauses on murder
committed in the furtherance of a criminal drug conspiracy or a
drive-by-shooting.
4 2
To some extent, the clauses of the new American
statutes are comparable to the aggravating criteria in the
European penal codes. The American clause that the killing
was committed in an "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel
manner" must be considered vague in a way similar to the
requirement in the German Penal Code that the defendant
acted "treacherously." Like the German courts have done with
"treacherously," the American courts have interpreted the
"heinous, atrocious or cruel" clause to give it a more definite
content.3  Legislatures and courts have cooperated in
41 KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 529 n.11. See, e.g., criminal street gangs,
18 U.S.C. § 521 (2000).42 KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 529 n.11. The death penalty may be
imposed for gun murders committed during federal drug trafficking crimes, 18 U.S.C. §
924 (2000) and for a "drive-by shooting," 18 U.S.C. § 36 (2000).
See, e.g., Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (the "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" characterization could be made constitutional by a
"limiting instruction." Such construction would not have to be limited to torture or
serious physical abuse); As to other aggravating factors see Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S.
463 (1993) (the phrase "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" meets constitutional requirements
as an "utter disregard for human rights"); Riley v. State, 366 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1978)
(aggravating circumstance of "terribly cruel, ruthless and heinous murder" misapplied
for death penalty purposes); Lewis v. State, 398 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1981) (murder by
shooting not "heinous, atrocious and cruel" as a matter of law for purposes of
sentencing).
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developing clear and manageable definitions that provide
guidance and restrict discretion.
In an American sentencing hearing, if the jury or the
judge finds at least one aggravating circumstance enumerated
in a post-Furman statute, they may inflict the death penalty.
They are, however, not required to do so, especially if they find
one or more mitigating factors. The most important mitigating
factors are also enumerated in the new statutes. 4 In general,
the statutes offer the following criteria as mitigating factors:
* Diminished mental capacity or emotional
disturbance.
• Duress or domination of another person.
• Belief that the circumstances provided a moral
justification or extenuation of the crime.
* The actual killing was committed by another
participant of the murder and the defendant's
role in the crime was relatively minor.
* Youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.
* Absence of a serious criminal record.
There is no question that some of these factors may also
serve as defenses to reduce or exclude liability when the
defendant's guilt is decided. If the evidence the defendant has
introduced at the trial has proven insufficient to save him or
her from a first-degree murder conviction, the defendant can
offer it again at the sentencing hearing.
The U.S. Supreme Court held that mitigating
circumstances that may be considered at the sentencing
hearing may not be limited by statute.45 Some of the non-
statutory mitigating circumstances often introduced by the
defendant are that the defendant was an abused or neglected
4KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 536-38; SALTZBURG, supra note 23, at 372-
74.
45 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
[Vol. 67: 3
THE DEATH PENALTY IN JAPAN
child or that the defendant had problems with drug or alcohol
abuse. Mitigating circumstances do not need to relate to the
defendant's culpability, they can refer to anything that may be
helpful, such as the defendant's good behavior in prison while
awaiting trial. If the judge or the jury finds a mitigating factor
they are not obligated to automatically grant mercy. Rather,
they have to take mitigating as well as aggravating
circumstances into consideration and balance them. This is not
done by applying a mathematical formula that, for example,
three mitigating factors outweigh one aggravating factor.
Balancing the different circumstances is a value judgment in
which the judge or the jury has to consider the totality of what
has been offered in aggravation and mitigation.
There is, however, one mitigating factor mandating
against imposition of the death penalty. The Supreme Court
held that there was "social consensus" that imposing the death
penalty on a defendant who was fifteen-years-old or younger
when he had committed the murder violated evolving
standards of decency. 6 Whether such "social consensus" really
exists in the United States remains an open question because
the statutes of nine American states expressly provide for
capital punishment in cases where the killer is fifteen years
old. 7 The "social consensus" argument must, therefore, be
taken as another example of the Supreme Court's dynamic
interpretation of the American Constitution rather than as a
description of the social reality in America.
The wide scope of mitigating circumstances, as well as
the unguided balancing of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, leave the American jury and judge with much
freedom in their decisions. Arguably this is not very different
from the discretion Japanese judges enjoy in capital cases.
There are, however, two decisive differences between Japanese
and American law. First, American juries and judges are
authorized to consider only those aggravating factors that are
enumerated in a statute. The legislature must have defined the
particular instances where the death penalty may be inflicted.
Second, it is not kept secret in the United States which
aggravating and mitigating criteria may be taken into
46 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830, 838 (1988).47 SALTZBURG, supra note 23, at 372.
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consideration. There is an open debate about the proper
interpretation of those criteria and there is also an open
discussion about which non-statutory mitigating circumstances
should be admitted at the sentencing hearing. The new
American statutes with their lists of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances are certainly far from perfect, but
they prove that in the United States serious efforts are
undertaken to make decisions on capital punishment more
rational, reasonable, and explicable.
In most of the American states retaining the death
penalty, the defendant has a right to a sentencing hearing
conducted before a jury.4 Unless the defendant waives this
right, the jury listens to the evidence presented by the
prosecutor and defense counsel and then decides by unanimous
vote whether the defendant shall be executed or sent to prison.
In the majority of the death penalty states, the jury's decision
is binding on the judge; in other states, the jury can only make
a non-binding recommendation.49 In the latter ones, the judge
is authorized to sentence to imprisonment where the jury has
recommended death, but the judge can also impose a death
sentence where the jury has recommended life. 0 There are also
a few states where the judge alone decides on life and death
without any input from the jury.5
The Supreme Court did not find the restriction or
exclusion of a jury unconstitutional. 2 One Justice noted,
however, that jury sentencing is desirable in capital cases in
order "to maintain a link between contemporary community
values and the penal system."5 3 In this context, the Justice also
referred to the "evolving standards of decency" and the
48 KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 527; SALTZBURG, supra note 23, at 377.
49 KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 528; SALTZBURG, supra note 23, at 377.
KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 528.
51Id.; SALTZBURG, supra note 23, at 377.r2 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (holding that the death
penalty "is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of... the
procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 297-298 (1972) (noting that juries can refuse to convict in capital cases and
'committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or
death in capital cases" is not unconstitutional) (quoting McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183, 199, 207 (1971)).
' Gregg, 428 U.S. at 190 (internal citations omitted).
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"progress of a maturing society. These statements can again
be taken as an example of the dynamic interpretation that, to
some extent, is typical of contemporary American legal
reasoning. At the same time, the statements are an expression
of the effort to make the law on capital punishment more
rational and better explicable, i.e. less "absurd."
Empirical research has revealed, however, that the
American practice in capital cases does not always live up to
these high expectations.5 American juries obviously do not
always follow the legally prescribed program in their decisions
on life and death. They appear, above all, to be influenced by
the evidence of the defendant's guilt that they heard during the
trial. They also seem to work under the erroneous assumption
that they are required to impose a death sentence whenever
they agree that the killing was committed under aggravating
circumstances. Mitigating factors seem to play hardly any role
in their decision.56
The American practice can, however, not be taken as
evidence that aggravating and mitigating circumstances do not
provide any guidance in capital cases. The way American juries
function is, rather, a consequence of the peculiar features of
American criminal justice administration.57  No similar
problems seem to exist when the decision on life and death is
left to the judge."
One can also not ignore the disproportionate number of
blacks, poor, uneducated and mentally impaired on death row.
There are obviously a number of additional factors in the
American criminal justice administration that influence the
decision on life and death. This is not the place to speculate
about those factors. It seems, however, that certain aspects of
the American practice of imposing capital punishment must be
64 Id.
Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt
is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation is No Excuse, 66 BROOK.
L. REV. 1011 (2001).
6 Id. at 1052.
5 7 Id. at 1050; see also KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 528, 544-546;
SALTzBURG, supra note 23, at 377-78.
Issues that do not arise in judicial imposition of the death penalty, for
example, are unanimous as opposed to majority jury decisions, and "death-qualified
juries," that is, juries that exclude individuals so opposed to the death penalty that
they would vote against it in any circumstance.
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considered racist, inegalitarian, and irrational-in brief
"absurd."
II. FROM IMPOSITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT TO ITS
EXECUTION
"Absurdity" is a concept that may also help to evaluate
the proceedings after capital punishment is imposed and before
it is executed. In Japan, these proceedings show peculiar
characteristics: The Minister of Justice has broad and
uncontrolled discretion whether or not to issue a death
warrant. In general, convicts languish on death row for a long
time. Conditions of confinement on death row are extremely
harsh. Executions are veiled in secrecy.
A. The Broad and Uncontrolled Discretion of the Japanese
Minister of Justice
Article 475 of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure
provides that the death penalty shall be executed upon an
order of the Minister of Justice and that this order shall be
given within six months after the judgment has become final.59
Under Article 476 of the Code the execution shall be carried
out within five days after the minister has issued the death
warrant. 60 In both provisions, the term "shall" (shinakereba
naranai) is used. According to the general rules of statutory
construction, the term means that the law must be followed.
In Japanese practice, however, only the five-day period
seems to have been taken seriously.6 Japanese Ministers of
Justice did not always issue the execution order within six
months." In a number of cases the reason was that the convict
had brought an appeal or requested a pardon. Whenever such
'9 KEIJI SOSH6H6 [Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure], 1948, art. 475; see
also SHIGEMITSU DANDO, JAPANESE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 471-72 (B.J. George,
trans., 1965).
KEIJI SOSHHm, art. 476; see also DANDO, supra note 59, at 472.
61 Llompart, supra note 6, at 161; Llompart, supra note 2, at 356; Daniel H.
Foote, 'The Door that Never Opens"?: Capital Punishment and Postconviction Review of
Death Sentences in the United States and Japan, 19 BROOI. J. INT'L L. 367, 413 (1993).
62 Id.
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an appeal or request is pending the six months period is
suspended.' Yet, Japanese Ministers of Justice have also in
other cases felt free not to adhere to the six months limit.
Thus, they have changed the legal requirement into a simple
recommendation even though it should be expected that a
Minister of Justice takes special pains to follow the law.
No official reasons have been given for delaying the
issuing of death warrants. One might assume that ministers
have refrained from ordering an execution to give convicts a
chance, but it seems questionable what such a chance could
have been. The case of Hirasawa Sadamichi proves that the
reason for not issuing a death warrant may be more mundane.
Hirasawa had languished on death row for thirty-two years
until he died in 1987 of illness at the age of ninety-five. When a
former Minister of Justice was later asked in an interview why
he had not signed an order to execute Hirasawa, he answered
that he had hesitated to do what so many Ministers of Justice
before him had not done.'
Japanese statistics show that each year only a few
offenders are sentenced to death and the number of executions
that are carried out is small. In 1999, there were eight
convictions and "only" five executions.' In the year 2000, the
figures were fourteen and three respectively." In the first years
of the 1990s there was a period of three years and four months
when no executions had taken place. The reason for that was,
however, not the beginning of a general tendency to show
mercy. The tide turned in 1993 when a new coalition
government of conservative and left wing forces replaced the
government of the Liberal Democratic Party that had been in
power for a long time. Two Ministers of Justice of the new
government ordered seven executions, three to be carried out
on the same day in March 1993 and four on the same day in
November of that year.8
Foote, supra note 61, at 413-14.
Llompart, supra note 2, at 362; Manako Ihaya, The Death Penalty, JAPAN
TIMES WKLY., Apr. 20, 1991, at A5.
Nempo Shikei Haishi (Death Penalty Abolition Annual) 2000-2001, Impact
Press 3, at 173 (2001).
"Id.
6 7 Foote, supra note 61, at 385; Domikovd-Hashimoto, Japan and Capital
Punishment, 6 HUI. AFF. 77 (1966).
"Foote, supra note 61, at 516; Domikovd-Hashimoto, supra note 67, at 77.
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As usual, the Ministers declined to comment on the
executions. There is, however, reason to assume that the death
warrants were issued by the members of the new government
in order to avoid criticism that had been leveled against the
former government by advocates of the death penalty.69
Obviously, politics have taken priority over legal
considerations-an approach that is popular also in the United
States today.
One should not forget that Japanese Ministers of
Justice70 are generally not lawyers and, thus, not used to
thinking in legal categories. Often the Ministers do not seem to
take the initiative in issuing a death warrant. Instead, they
wait for their subordinates in the ministry to present the cases.
Therefore, it may not always be the Minister but a subordinate
working somewhere in the hierarchy of the ministry who plays
the most important role in the decision on life and death.71
It is questionable how the practice of not issuing death
warrants-a practice that is, at least to some extent, directed
by politics and dominated by wide and uncontrolled
discretion-can avoid displaying features of irrationality,
unreasonableness, inexplicability, and, "absurdity."
Likewise, in some American states the decision to
execute a convict rests with an administrative agency, or
sometimes with the governor. Hardly anything is known about
this procedure even though there is much debate about all
other aspects of capital punishment. Keeping in mind that over
3500 convicts are languishing on death row and that their
number has been steadily rising,72 one can only guess to what
extent political and other considerations might influence the
final decision on life and death.
B. Long Terms on Death Row
Another problem is that Japanese convicts generally
spend long terms on death row before they are executed. It has
69 Domikovi-Hashimoto, supra note 67, at 88; SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 531.
70 Japanese Ministers of Justice are politically appointed.
71 SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 310; Ihaya, supra note 64, at A3.
72 See Death Penalty Information Center, Size of Death Row by Year, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DrowInfo.html#year (last visited Mar. 15, 2002).
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been reported that, on average, they wait between five and ten
years, but a considerable number wait between two and three
decades.73 As mentioned above, Hirasawa spent thirty-two
years on death row until he finally died. Menda Sakae also
languished in prison for thirty-two years before he was
released. As is well known, Menda was the first death row
convict to eventually win an acquittal in post-war Japan.74
Thus, in some cases delays in Japan have been much longer
than in the United States.75
Article 32 of the Japanese Penal Code provides for a
thirty year period of limitation for the execution of the death
penalty.76 In spite of this clear legal requirement, Hirasawa,
Menda, and other convicts were not released from death row
after the thirty year period had expired. Hirasawa brought a
complaint requesting that he be released, but the Ministry of
Justice did not grant his request. It argued that "'execution" in
Article 32 should be interpreted to include not only the hanging
itself but all steps that are taken in executing the judgment.77
According to this interpretation, execution begins as soon as
the convict starts waiting on death row until the hanging takes
place.78 Hirasawa appealed, but the Japanese Supreme Court
followed the argument of the Ministry of Justice.79
This kind of legal reasoning must be considered a
typical example of conceptual jurisprudence, which tries to
achieve the desired result by bending the clear language of the
Code. It neglects to ask what interests are protected by the
legal norm. Provisions limiting the execution of punishment in
penal codes of other countries are mainly based on the idea
that human justice should not result in eternal revenge and
deterrence. It should be asked whether this idea is alien to
Japanese criminal justice.
The consequence of the Supreme Court's interpretation
of Article 32 is that the court imposing capital punishment
73 MIYAZAWA, supra note 7, at 738; Foote, supra note 61, at 412; Doug Struck,
Where Capital Punishment is Cloaked, INTL HERALD TRIB., May 4, 2001, at 2.
T SCH IDT, supra note 7, at 310; Ihaya, supra note 64, at 3.
75 Foote, supra note 61, at 412.
76 KEIH6, art. 32, translated in, DANDO, supra note 10, at 409.
77 Llompart, supra note 6, at 166; SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 278.78 Id.
79 1d.
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officially inflicts two penalties: first a prison term to be spent
on death row-a term that may last longer than thirty years;
and second, the hanging itself. It seems questionable whether
this kind of legal reasoning is reconcilable with the prohibition
against punishing someone twice for the same offense.
Actually, in Japan a third kind of punishment is
imposed with each death penalty: The life of the convict on
death row is totally dominated by the uncertainty of whether
and when the execution will be carried out. The essence of the
convict's life is reduced to waiting to be killed. The permanent
fear of being forced to die at the hands of another is an
exquisite psychological torture that creates severe emotional,
mental, and also physical suffering. Convicts have become
insane; they have been driven to commit suicide.80 There can be
no doubt that these dehumanizing effects make long detention
on death row unreasonable, senseless, inexplicable-and
"absurd."
In the United States some argue that to an extent
convicts themselves are responsible for the long periods they
have to spend on death row because they delay their execution
by bringing a great number of appeals and applications for
mercy.8 This must, however, be considered a cynical argument
because convicts are only exercising their rights. The
dehumanizing effect of the lengthy detention on death row does
not get less severe only because an appeal or an application for
mercy is pending. Courts in several countries have viewed
such extended periods on death row as illegal or
unconstitutional. As a consequence, they have replaced death
sentences by life imprisonment.
8 2
80 See generally H. Bluestone & C.L. McGahee, Reaction to Extreme Stress:
Impending Death by Execution, 119 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 393 (1962); Robert Johnson,
Under Sentence of Death: The Psychology of Death Row Confinement, 5 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REv. 141 (1979); John Kaplan, Administering Capital Punishment, 36 U.
FLA. L. REV. 177 (1984) (discussing the death row syndrome).
8' Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (1960); U.S. ex rel. Townsend v.
Twomey, 322 F. Supp. 158, 174 (1971); Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491 (1990).
See also Foote, supra note 61, at 412; Potts v. State, 376 S.E.2d 851, 859 (Ga. 1989)
(waiting for execution is not intolerably cruel, since innocent, terminally ill patients
suffer similar fates).
E.g., India: Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. [1983] S.C. 361
(eight years on death row); Ahmed v. State of Maharashtra, A.IR. [1985] S.C. 231 (two
years and nine months); Mehta v. Union of India, [19891 3 S.C.R. 775 (more than eight
years); Zimbabwe: Catholic Comm'n v. Attorney-General, [1993] 4 S.A. 239, (several
[Vol. 67: 3
THE DEATH PENALTY IN JAPAN
C. Harsh Conditions on Death Row in Japanese Prisons
There is no official information about life on death row
in Japanese prisons. In recent years, however, a few reports
from private sources have shed some light on this dark area. 3
They will be briefly summed up here even though it can only be
hoped that some of the reported facts are not true.
Convicts on Japanese death row are kept in solitary
confinement. They are not allowed to move about in their small
cells. They are not allowed to lie down except at night or for a
brief nap at midday. They have to sit at a fixed place all day,
but they are not allowed to lean against the wall. No matter
how many years or decades convicts have to spend on death
row, they are not allowed to talk with other convicts,
sometimes they may not even look at each other. Convicts have
to keep the strictest military discipline. Prison guards do not
address convicts by their names but by numbers. Convicts may
do only very simple work, mainly paper-crafts. They are not
allowed to have their own radio, television set, personal
computer, clock, or calendar. They can only listen to a radio
program selected by the prison authority. Convicts can have a
limited number of books, but law books and political magazines
seem to be excluded.
For convicts who are likely to commit suicide there are
special cells with permanent lighting so they can be surveilled
by video cameras. Windows in these cells are sometimes closed
by iron plates with small holes that do not allow enough fresh
air to come in. It is also reported that convicts who never
thought about suicide but had brought an appeal against their
conviction were placed in these cells, some of them for long
periods.
Life on death row in Japan also seems to be dominated
by the principle of strict isolation. Convicts are allowed to
contact only close relatives and their lawyer if they happen to
have one. All communication is, however, strictly supervised.
Contacts with the media, Members of Parliament, and other
convicts with terms between four and six years); Jamaica: Pratt v. Attorney General,
[1993] 3 W.LR. 995 (fourteen years).
0 Koichi Kikuta, Capital Punishment in Japan and the International Code, 7
MEIJI L. J. 1 (2000); Struck, supra note 73, at 2.
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politicians are prohibited. Also members of the Human Rights
Commission of the Council of Europe, who visited Japan in
early 2001, were not permitted to contact a convict on death
row even though the convict had, with the help of his wife,
given his consent.'
It is interesting to compare Japanese conditions on
death row with those in American prisons. Death rows in the
United States have been criticized as harsh, inhuman, and
degrading.s In some respects, however, the convict's fate on
death row in Japan seems to be even worse than that of an
American convict.
In the United States-like in many other countries-
convicts are free to communicate with the media. The media
can, on their own initiative, seek contacts with convicts. Under
the U.S. Constitution, which protects the freedom of the press,
such contacts are considered to be the right not only of the
convict but also of the media. 6 Freedom of the press is
essential to a democracy because without such freedom there
could hardly be any efficient check on the government.
Freedom of the press is also guaranteed by the Japanese
Constitution." It is an open question how the prohibition of
contacts between media and convicts on death row can be
justified in view of that guaranteed freedom.
In general, convicts on death row in America are
allowed to call collect family, friends, and attorneys. They can
also have visits by family and friends at regular intervals.
Attorneys have the right to visit convicts whenever necessary.
In some prisons, "contact visits" are permitted where convicts
can freely circulate among family and friends.
84 Anne Schneppen, Jeden Morgen kann der Henker kommen, FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE, Feb. 24, 2001, at 11.
85 For an official statement, see the decision of the European Court of Human
Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989).
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (publishers have a legitimate
First Amendment interest in communicating with prisoners when prisoners willingly
subscribe to their publications); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826, 835 (1974)
(regulations prohibiting in-person interviews between prisoners and the press allow
prison officials appropriate latitude to preserve security and are constitutional "so long
as reasonable and effective means of communication remain open and no
discrimination in terms of content is involved").
87 NIHON KOKU KEMP5, supra note 9, art. 21.
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In Japan, it is argued that isolating convicts is
necessary because outside contacts would disturb the stability
of the mind and the peace of the heart." Convicts should only
prepare themselves for their death and seek any opportunity
for penance.89 These arguments are evidence of a highly
moralistic, paternalistic, and authoritarian attitude because
they dictate how stability of the mind and peace of the heart is
to be found. It is an unfounded assumption that contacts with
family and friends could not help the convict find some kind of
emotional stability. Also, the repressive conditions on death
row in Japan and the tormenting rules regulating every detail
of the convict's life hardly seem able to create an environment
where stability and peace could evolve. To believe that such
inhuman and degrading conditions could in any way help the
convict would be "absurd."
D. Secrecy Surrounding Executions in Japan
Executions in Japan are shrouded in secrecy. The
convict may be informed one or two days in advance when he or
she is scheduled to die, but this is not always the case.
Ordinarily, convicts learn about their imminent execution only
when prison officers come to fetch them from their cell.9"
Therefore, convicts live in permanent fear. Whenever convicts
hear steps coming close to their cell they must be afraid their
time has come.9'
Relatives and defense counsel are not informed until
after the execution has taken place. When they write a letter
they can never be sure the convict will still be able to read it.
When they visit the convict they never know whether it is the
last time they will have this opportunity. Japanese authorities
claim executions must be kept secret in order to avoid last
minute appeals and emotional scenes as well as to protect the
convict's and his or her family's privacy.92
Kikuta, supra note 83, at 1; DomikovA-Hashimoto, supra note 67, at 81.89 Id.
so Kim & Garcia, supra note 39, at 276; Ihaya, supra note 64, at 4; Schneppen,
supra note 84, at 11.
91 Ihaya, supra note 64, at 4; Schneppen, supra note 84, at 11.
92 Kim & Garcia, supra note 39, at 275; Domikovd-Hashimoto, supra note 67,
at 80; Struck, supra note 73, at 2.
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These arguments are another expression of the
paternalistic and authoritarian attitude dominating the
administration of death row. Such a secretive process severely
curtails defense counsel's right to bring an appeal. As the
general public is never informed about an imminent execution,
it remains unclear why the convict's and the family's privacy
require absolute secrecy.
In the United States executions are always announced
to the public. As a consequence, they are often accompanied by
protests against capital punishment as well as pro-death
penalty demonstrations. Sometimes there is also a media
circus around the prison where the execution is carried out. In
spring 2001, there even was a public debate whether the
execution of Timothy McVeigh should be shown on television.
McVeigh had bombed the Federal Building in Oklahoma City,
killing 168 people. Claiming that he was an enemy of the
United States, McVeigh himself had requested that the
execution of the enemy be carried out in public.9
Coming back to Camus' observation, return to public
executions would certainly be "absurd." At the same time, are
executions shrouded in absolute secrecy with their inhuman
and degrading side effects less "absurd"?
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Essay was not simply to argue that
capital punishment should be abolished. Instead, the paper has
tried to achieve a more limited goal by pointing out two
problem areas of capital punishment in Japan. Objections have
been raised against Article 199 of the Japanese Penal Code
because it provides the judge with almost unlimited discretion
and severely restricts the defense. Criticism has also been
leveled against the mental and physical torments the convict
has to suffer on death row. It is hoped, however, that this
criticism might become a step on the road towards the end of
capital punishment in Japan.
93 Anthony J. Blinken, Listen to the People, Capital Punishment is More
Popular in Europe than its Politicians Admit, TIME (International), May 21, 2001, at
37; The Rights and Wrongs. Should America Kill the Oklahoma City Bomber?, THE
ECONOMIST, May 12, 2001, at 11.
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On the other hand, it must be feared that the criticism
will remain purely academic because it has always been
claimed in Japan that public opinion is not only in favor of
capital punishment but also indifferent to the conditions on
death row.' This was supported by public opinion polls that
have been taken in Japan at regular intervals." It seems that
those polls are, in general, taken rather seriously by Japanese
politicians.
Such wholesale reference to public opinion must,
however, be considered the end of any rational debate. The
public is invisible, not responsible for anything, it does not give
reasons for its opinion. Yet, it is essential for a modern,
democratic society to have public debates exchanging rational
arguments about important social problems-and Capital
punishment is certainly one of those problems.
Psychologists have explained that the result of public
opinion polls can easily be influenced by the way questions are
phrased. It seems that questions asked in Japanese polls have
often been one-sided and have invited answers favoring the
death penalty.96 Such manipulations make it even more
questionable to rely on the will of the Japanese people.97
In the United States it has also been a common
argument that the public is strongly in favor of capital
punishment. But the tide seems to be turning. While polls in
1994 showed that some eighty percent of Americans supported
capital punishment, the figures were down to about sixty-five
percent in early 2001.98 There was also no public criticism when
Governor Ryan of Illinois decided to suspend all executions in
the state after some inmates on death row were found to have
been wrongly convicted.99
SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 369; MIYAZAWA, supra note 7, at 733; Haruo
Nishihara, Die Idee des Lebens im Japanischen Strafrechtsdenken, 32 U. AUGSBURG
UNIVERSITAETSREDEN 17, 27 (1997); Ihaya, supra note 64, at 5; Struck, supra note 73,
at2.
95 SCHMIDT, supra note 7, at 621.
Domikovi-Hashimoto, supra note 67, at 83; Ihaya, supra note 64, at 5.
9Id.
98 Mark Hansen, Death Knell for the Death Penalty, 86 A.B.A. J. 40,41 (2000).
9Id. at 41; Blinken, supra note 93, at 37. See also John Harwood, Death
Reconsidered-Despite McVeigh Case, Curbs on Executions are Gaining Support, WALL
ST. J., May 22, 2001, atAl.
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Public opinion is obviously elusive, it may change faster
than one might expect. It remains to be seen how public
opinion will develop in Japan.
